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PERIODIC ATTRACTOR IN THE DISCRETE TIME
BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS OF THE
ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS GAME
JOSE´ PEDRO GAIVA˜O AND TELMO PEIXE
Abstract. The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a classic non-
cooperative game widely studied in terms of its theoretical analysis
as well as in its applications, ranging from sociology and biology to
economics. Many experimental results of the RPS game indicate
that this game is better modelled by the discretized best-response
dynamics rather than continuous time dynamics. In this work we
show that the attractor of the discrete time best-response dynamics
of the RPS game is finite and periodic. Moreover we also describe
the bifurcations of the attractor and determine the exact number,
period and location of the periodic strategies.
1. Introduction
The widely known Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game consists of two
players, each one throwing one hand forward making one of three pos-
sible symbols:
(R) Rock, represented by the closed hand;
(P) Paper, represented by the open hand; and
(S) Scissors, represented by the closed hand with exactly two fingers
extended.
At each turn the players compare the symbols represented by their
hands and decide who wins as follows:
• Paper (P) wins Rock (R);
• Scissors (S) wins Paper (P); and
• Rock (R) wins Scissors (S);
forming a dominance cycle as depicted in Figure 1. It is considered a
draw if both players make the same symbol.
The RPS game is thus a game with three pure strategies which in
its normal form can be represented by the payoff matrix
A =
 0 −b aa 0 −b
−b a 0
 , a, b > 0. (1)
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Figure 1. Cyclic dominance in the RPS game.
The most commonly known version of this game is the symmetric case,
where what the players win is the same as what they lose (called a
zero-sum game), and which can be represented by the payoff matrix
A with a = b = 1. In the case where a > b we say that the game is
favourable, since in this situation what the players can win is greater
than what they can loose. In the other case where a < b, we say that
the game is unfavourable because what the players can win is less than
what they can loose. A game with a more general payoff matrix where
all a’s and b’s are different is analyzed in [1].
The RPS game is often used as a model for studying the evolution
of competitive strategies (non-cooperative games) in dominance cy-
cles [24]. Namely, in the theoretical economics field this game has been
used to qualitatively study price dynamics [12]. A widely studied case
of cyclical dominance in economics is the designated Edgworth price cy-
cle [15] which describes the cyclical pattern of price changes in a given
market, such as the retail price cycles in the gasoline market [18].
In evolutionary game theory we can study the evolution of a given
game using different models, such as the replicator equation or the best-
response function. Suppose that in a given population some individuals
have the capability to change their strategy at any time, switching to a
strategy that is the best-response to their opponents’ current strategy.
A function that models this situation is the classical Brown-Robinson
procedure, or fictitious play, initially studied by G. Brown [4] and J.
Robinson [22]. Brown studied two versions of the fictitious play model,
the discrete and the continuous time. The continuous time version,
up to a time re-parametrisation that only affects the velocity of the
motion, is given by the differential inclusion
x′(t) ∈ BR(x(t))− x(t),
where BR(x(t)) is the best-response to the strategy x(t) at time t. This
is the designated Best-Response dynamics (BR) [16].
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For the BR dynamics of the RPS game, by [1, Theorem 2] we have
that when a ≥ b (favourable and zero-sum games), the Nash equilib-
rium is globally attracting, and when a < b (unfavourable game), the
Nash equilibrium is repelling and the global attractor is a periodic orbit
known as the Shapley triangle.
Suppose now that in a short period of time ε a small fraction ε of
randomly chosen people from the population can change their strategy
for a better strategy BR(x(t)) relative to the current state x(t) of the
population. In this case we have
x(t+ ε) ∈ (1− ε)x(t) + εBR(x(t)), (2)
which is a discretization of the BR dynamics. This discretized version
has been studied by several other authors, e.g., J. Hofbauer and its
collaborators [11, 3, 2], D. Monderer et al. [17], C. Harris [10], and V.
Krishna and T. Sjo¨stro¨m [13].
Many experiments (e.g., [23, 6, 25]) on the evolution of the choices of
strategies that each person makes as they play the RPS game evidence
a dynamics that is well modelled by the discrete time best-response
rather than the continuous time version.
The work we present here was also motivated by the paper of P.
Bednarik and J. Hofbauer [2] where they study the discretized best-
response dynamics for the RPS game. They focus on the symmetric
case with a = b = 1, making in the end some extension to the general
case a, b > 0. In their main result, they prove that the attractor is
contained in an annulus shaped triangular region and find a family of
periodic strategies inside that region.
In this paper we also study the discretized best-response dynamics
for the RPS game. We consider the general case a, b > 0 and our main
result says that the attractor of the discretized best-response dynamics
for the RPS game is made of a finite number of periodic strategies, as
stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1.1. The attractor of the discretized best-response dynamics
of the rock-paper-scissors game is finite and periodic, i.e., every strategy
converges to a periodic strategy and there are at most a finite number
of them.
We also describe in detail the bifurcations of the attractor and deter-
mine the exact number, period and location of the periodic strategies.
See Theorem 6.7 for a full description. For instance, we show that
every periodic strategy has a period which is a multiple of 3 and the
attractor is formed by a chain of such periodic strategies enumerated
by their period, i.e., with consecutive periods. Denote by N(ε) the
number of distinct periodic strategies (which also depends on a and
b). In the zero-sum game (a = b), we show that N(ε) grows without
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bound as ε→ 0. In fact,
N(ε) =

log
(
2+ε−
√
3ε(4−ε)
2(1−ε)
)
log(1− ε)
− 1 and limε→0N(ε) =∞.
Moreover, the attractor is formed by the union of periodic strategies
having periods 3, 6, . . . , 3N(ε), converging to the Nash equilibrium of
the game.
In the non-zero-sum game (a 6= b) we show that the number N(ε)
of periodic strategies stays bounded as ε→ 0. Although more compli-
cated, similar formulas for N(ε) are known in the non-zero-sum case.
For instance, when a > b (favourable game), we know that
lim
ε→0
N(ε) =
⌈
3a
a− b
⌉
− 1.
This fact is rather surprising as the authors of [2, pag. 84] write:
”Overall, if a > b, the dynamics behaves qualitatively very similarly
to the case a = b : more and more periodic orbits emerge, as ε → 0”.
When a < b (unfavourable game), the number N(ε) has no limit as
ε → 0, i.e., it alternates between the integers ⌈ b
b−a
⌉ − 1 and ⌈ b
b−a
⌉
for
every ε sufficiently small. Unlike before, in this case the periods of the
periodic strategies grow like 3 log(b/a)/ε as ε → 01. Moreover, when
the game is favourable (a > b), the attractor converges to the Nash
equilibrium, whereas in the unfavourable case (a < b), the attractor
converges to the Shapley triangle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we intro-
duce the best-response function and define the map T whose dynamics
we analyse in this paper. We also introduce the general Rock-Paper-
Scissors game. In Section 3, using the symmetry of the game we reduce
the dynamics to a subregion of the phase space. In Section 4 we define
a Poincare´ map and prove some of its properties in Appendix A. In
Section 5 we prove Theorem 1.1 using results from the previous Sec-
tions 3 and 4. In Section 6 we describe in detail the bifurcations of
the attractor and in Section 7 we discuss related work and some open
problems.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Best-Response dynamics. A population game with d ≥ 2 pure
strategies is determined by a payoff matrix A = (ai,j) ∈ Rd×d where
ai,j is the payoff of the population playing the pure strategy i against
the pure strategy j. A mixed strategy is a probability vector x ∈ ∆
1In fact, the smallest period is 3
(⌊
log(a/b)
log(1−ε)
⌋
+ 1
)
∼ 3 log(b/a)ε as ε→ 0.
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where ∆ denote the (d− 1)-dimensional simplex,
∆ =
{
(x1, . . . , xd) ∈ Rd : x1 + · · ·+ xd = 1, xi ≥ 0
}
.
The best-response against y ∈ ∆ is
BR(y) = arg max
x∈∆
x>Ay.
The best-response is a multivalued map defined on ∆. Indeed, on the
indifferent sets (see Figure 2)
Γi,j = {y ∈ ∆: (Ay)i = (Ay)j ≥ (Ay)k, ∀ k = 1, . . . , d, i 6= j} ,
the BR takes any value in the convex combination of the canonical
vectors ei and ej. On the complement set ∆ \ Γ where Γ =
⋃
i 6=j Γi,j,
the best-response BR is piecewise constant, i.e., takes the single value
ei in the interior of BR
−1({ei}) relative to ∆.
Let T : ∆ \ Γ→ ∆ denote the map
T (x) = λx+ (1− λ) BR(x),
where λ ∈ (0, 1). This map is deduced from (2) considering λ = 1− ε.
In this paper we are interested in the dynamics of the map T . To that
end we need to introduce some terminology borrowed from dynamical
systems with discontinuities. A point x ∈ ∆ is called regular if T n(x) /∈
Γ for every n ≥ 0. The set of regular points is denoted by ∆ˆ. For a
generic payoff matrix A, the set of regular strategies ∆ˆ equals the set
∆ except for a countable number of co-dimension one hyperplanes.
Thus, ∆ˆ is a full measure (with respect to Lebesgue measure on ∆)
and residual subset of ∆. From a dynamical systems point of view, we
aim to describe the orbits of almost every point in ∆. This is the main
reason for considering T as a piecewise single-valued map and not a
multi-valued correspondence on the whole ∆.
Given x ∈ ∆ˆ we denote by OT (x) its orbit, i.e., the sequence OT (x) =
{T n(x)}n≥0. We say that a x ∈ ∆ˆ is periodic with period p ∈ N if
T p(x) = x and T k(x) 6= x for every 1 ≤ k < p. The ω-limit set of a
regular point x ∈ ∆ˆ is the set of limit points of its orbit. The attractor
of T , which we denote by Λ, is the closure of the union of ω(x) over
all x ∈ ∆ˆ. We say that T is asymptotically periodic if it has at most
a finite number of periodic regular points and the ω-limit set of every
regular point is a periodic orbit. In other words, T is asymptotically
periodic whenever its attractor Λ is finite and periodic.
2.2. Rock-Paper-Scissors game. Let A be the payoff matrix of the
RPS game introduced in Section 1. Define
α :=
a
b
,
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where a and b are the parameters of the payoff matrix A. Notice that
α > 0 for every a, b > 0. The symmetric case a = b corresponds to
α = 1.
Figure 2. The simplex ∆ with the regions Ri and the
indifference sets Γi,j.
The domain ∆\Γ of the map T is the union of three disjoint regions
(see Figure 2)
R1 =
{
x ∈ ∆: x1 > (α−1)x2+1α+2 ∧ x3 < (α−1)x1+1α+2
}
,
R2 =
{
x ∈ ∆: x2 > (α−1)x3+1α+2 ∧ x1 < (α−1)x2+1α+2
}
,
R3 =
{
x ∈ ∆: x3 > (α−1)x1+1α+2 ∧ x2 < (α−1)x3+1α+2
}
,
and the map T restricted to Ri has the expression
T (x) = λx+ (1− λ)ei+1, x ∈ Ri ,
where i + 1 is taken module 3 and {ei} denotes the canonical basis of
R3. Let S : ∆ → ∆ be the map (x1, x2, x3) 7→ (x2, x3, x1). Clearly, S
leaves ∆ \ Γ invariant. Indeed, S(Ri+1) = Ri. Moreover,
Lemma 2.1.
S ◦ T = T ◦ S
Proof. For any x ∈ Ri,
S (T (x)) = S (λx+ (1− λ)ei+1) = λS(x) + (1− λ)ei = T (S(x)) .

This means that S is a symmetry for T . In the following section we
will use this symmetry to reduce the study of the dynamics of T to a
single map with domain R1.
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Let
uα := (α + 2, 1− α, 0). (3)
Then, we can express R1 in a more compact way
R1 = {x ∈ ∆: uα · x > 1 ∧ S(uα) · x < 1}
where · denotes the standard inner-product in R3. Similar expressions
hold for R2 and R3.
3. Reduction by symmetry
Using the symmetry S we construct a skew-product map F which
has the same dynamics as T . We proceed as follows.
Let pi :
⋃
iRi → R1 defined by pi(x) = Si−1(x) when x ∈ Ri and
define
Γ1 = R1 ∩ T−1(Γ).
Next, let f : R1 \ Γ1 → R1 be the map defined by f(x) = pi ◦ T (x)
for x ∈ R1 \ Γ1. Clearly, R1 \ Γ1 is the union of two regions
A = {x ∈ R1 : uα · x > α(λ−1 − 1) + 1},
B = {x ∈ R1 : uα · x < α(λ−1 − 1) + 1},
with common boundary equal to Γ1 (see Figure 3). Recall that uα is
defined in (3).
Figure 3. The simplex ∆ with the regions Ri, where
we can see the region R1 divided into subregions A and
B.
Moreover, f is an affine transformation on both A and B. Indeed,
f |A(x) = λx+ (1− λ)e2 and f |B(x) = λS(x) + (1− λ)e1.
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Note that the sets A and B are characterized by the property T (A) ⊂
R1 and T (B) ⊂ R2. By construction,
f ◦ pi = pi ◦ T.
Moreover, it is clear that x is a regular point in R1 if and only if
fn(x) /∈ Γ1 for every n ≥ 0.
Let Z3 denote the additive group of the integers module 3. Define
σ : R1 \ Γ1 → Z3 by σ(x) = 0 whenever x ∈ A and σ(x) = 1 otherwise.
Then, the skew-product F : (R1 \ Γ1)× Z3 → R1 × Z3 is given by
F (x, j) = (f(x), σ(x) + j), (x, j) ∈ (R1 \ Γ1)× Z3.
Lemma 3.1. The maps F and T are conjugated, i.e., there is a bijec-
tion h : ∆ \ Γ→ R1 × Z3 such that
F ◦ h = h ◦ T.
Proof. The bijection is h(x) = (pi(x), i − 1) whenever x ∈ Ri with
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. It is now a simple computation to check that F and T
are conjugated under h. 
By abuse of notation, we also use the symbol pi for the projection
from R1 × Z3 → R1 given by pi(x, i) = x.
Every periodic orbit of F (and so of T ) is mapped by pi into a single
periodic orbit of f . The converse relation is less obvious, and is clarified
in the next lemma. For regular x ∈ R1 let
σn(x) = σ(fn−1(x)) + · · ·+ σ(x) (mod 3), n ≥ 1.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that x ∈ R1 is a regular periodic point of f with
period p and that σp(x) 6= 0. Then, pi−1(Of (x)) is a single periodic
orbit of F of period 3p.
Proof. Note that, F n(x, j) = (fn(x), σn(x) + j). Let y ∈ pi−1(Of (x)).
Then y = (x′, i) for some x′ ∈ Of (x) and some i ∈ Z3. For every
integer j > 0, we have
F jp(y) = (f jp(x′), jσp(x′) + i) = (x′, jσp(x) + i).
It follows that y is a periodic point of F of period equal to
min{j ≥ 1: jσp(x) = 0} · p = 3p,
because σp(x) ∈ Z3 \{0} by hypothesis. This shows that every element
of pi−1(Of (x)) is a periodic point of F of period 3p. But pi−1(Of (x))
consists of 3p elements, so we conclude that pi−1(Of (x)) is a single
periodic orbit of F of period 3p.

Lemma 3.3. If f is asymptotically periodic, then T is asymptotically
periodic.
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Proof. Since f is asymptotically periodic, its attractor Λf consists of
a finite number of periodic regular points. As seen in the proof of
Lemma 3.2, every periodic regular point in Λf gives at most 3 periodic
regular points of F . Now suppose that x is a regular point of F . Then
pi(x) is a regular point of f . Because f is asymptotically periodic,
the orbit of pi(x) converges to a periodic regular point z ∈ Λf of f .
Thus, x converges to a periodic regular point in pi−1(z). This shows
that F is asymptotically periodic. Since F and T are conjugated (see
Lemma 3.1), we conclude that T is also asymptotically periodic. 
4. Poincare´ map
In this section we induce the dynamics of f on the region B. Define
the first return time n : R1 \ Γ1 → N to the closure of the set B by
n(x) = min{k ∈ N : fk(x) ∈ B}.
Lemma 4.1. The first return time is bounded, i.e., there is C =
C(α, λ) > 0 such that n(x) ≤ C for every x ∈ R1 \ Γ1.
Proof. Let x ∈ R1 \ Γ1. Since f |A(x) is a convex combination of x
and e2, to determine the upper bound C(α, λ) we have to find the first
n ∈ N such that (f |A)n (e1) ∈ B, that is the first n ∈ N such that
uα · (f |A)n (e1) ≤ α(λ−1 − 1) + 1 ,
which is equivalent to λn+1 ≤ α
2α+1
. Hence C := d−1+logλ
(
α
2α+1
)e. 
Since the first return time is bounded, we can define the Poincare´
map P : B → B by P (x) = fn(x)(x). Let
Bk = int(n
−1(k) ∩B).
Clearly, P |Bk = (f |A)k−1◦(f |Bk). By Lemma 4.1, there are only finitely
many non-empty sets Bk. This means that P is piecewise affine with a
finite number of branches. The following lemma gives an analytic ex-
pression for these sets Bk (see Figure 4) and corresponding restrictions
of the Poincare´ map. Let
bk := λ
−k−1α− λ−1(2α + 1) + α + 2.
Lemma 4.2. For any k ∈ N,
Bk = {x ∈ B : bk−1 < S2(uα) · x < bk},
P |Bk(x) = λkS(x) + λk−1(1− λ)e1 + (1− λk−1)e2 .
Proof. Let k ∈ N. By the definition of Bk we have that
Bk = {x ∈ B : fk(x) ∈ B ∧ f j(x) ∈ A,∀j < k}.
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Figure 4. The region R1, where B is divided into sub-
regions Bk of B delimited by S
2(uα) · x = bk−1 and
S2(uα) · x = bk.
Hence, for x ∈ Bk,
P (x) = (f |A)k−1 ◦ (f |B)(x)
= (f |A)k−1 (λS(x) + (1− λ)e1)
= λk−1 (λS(x) + (1− λ)e1) + (1− λk−1)e2
= λkS(x) + λk−1(1− λ)e1 + (1− λk−1)e2 .
Since P (x) ∈ B,
uα · P (x) ∈
(
1, α(λ−1 − 1) + 1) ,
but
uα · P (x) = uα ·
(
λkS(x) + λk−1(1− λ)e1 + (1− λk−1)e2
)
= λkS2(uα) · x+ λk−1(1− λ)(α + 2)− (1− λk−1)(α− 1)
= λkS2(uα) · x+ λk−1(α− 1 + (1− λ)(α + 2))− α + 1,
then
λ−kα < S2(uα) · x+ Cα,λ < λ−k−1α,
with Cα,λ = λ
−1(α− 1 + (1− λ)(α+ 2)), and bk = λ−k−1α− Cα,λ. 
Next, we will describe the monotonic dynamics of the Poincare´ map
P . Define
m = mα(λ) := min{k ∈ N : λk < α}.
Notice that m = 1 whenever α ≥ 1. Clearly,
m = 1 + max
{
0,
⌊
logα
log λ
⌋}
.
Denote by Bˆ the set of regular points inB, i.e., Bˆ = B∩∆ˆ. Given any
x ∈ Bˆ we define its itinerary i(x) = (i0, i1, i2, . . .) where ik = n(P k(x))
for every k ≥ 0. We describe the monotonicity of the Poincare´ map P
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. Let x ∈ Bˆ with itinerary i(x) = (i0, i1, i2, . . .). For
every k ≥ 0 the following holds:
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(1) If ik ≥ m, then ik+j ≥ m for every j ≥ 0.
(2) If ik ≥ m and ik+1 ≤ ik, then ik+2 ≤ ik+1.
(3) If ik+1 < m and ik+1 ≥ ik, then ik+2 ≥ ik+1.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas A.1, A.2 and A.3 stated and proved
in Appendix A. 
5. Proof of Theorem 1.1
In this section we show that f is asymptotically periodic. This im-
plies that T is asymptotically periodic by Lemma 3.3, thus proving the
main Theorem 1.1.
Let x ∈ Rˆ1 := R1 ∩ ∆ˆ be a regular point. By Lemma 4.1, there is
n0 ≥ 0 such that y := fn0(x) ∈ Bˆ. Let i(y) = (i0, i1, i2, . . .) be the
itinerary of y under the Poincare´ map P . Notice, by Lemma 4.1, that
ik ∈ {1, . . . , C} for every k ≥ 0 where C = C(α, λ) is the constant in
that lemma. We will show that the itinerary of y stabilizes, i.e., there
is q ≥ 0 such that ik+q = iq for every k ≥ 0. We have two cases:
(1) First suppose that ik < m for every k ≥ 0. Then either the
itinerary is non-increasing, which implies that the it stabilizes
or else there is p ≥ 0 such that ip+1 ≥ ip. In the former case,
by item (3) of Proposition 4.3, we conclude that the itinerary
is eventually non-decreasing, thus also stabilizes.
(2) Now suppose that there is some q ≥ 0 such that iq ≥ m. Then,
by item (1) of Proposition 4.3, we have that iq+k ≥ m for every
k ≥ 0. So, arguing as in the first case, either the itinerary is non-
decreasing, or else, by item (2) of Proposition 4.3, the itinerary
is eventually non-increasing. In either way we conclude that
the itinerary stabilizes.
Because the itinerary of y stabilizes, it means that after some iterate
the orbit of y belongs to Bp for some p ≥ 0, i.e., there is n1 > 0 such
that P n(y) ∈ Bp for every n ≥ n1. Since P restricted to Bp is an affine
contraction (see Lemma 4.2), we deduce that the orbit of y under the
map P converges to the unique fixed point of P |Bp , which we denote
by wp. Notice that wp belongs to the closure of Bp. We claim that
wp ∈ Bp. Indeed, if that was not the case, i.e., wp ∈ ∂Bp, then as the
orbit of y accumulates at wp and the map P |Bp rotates points by an
angle 2pi/3 about wp, the orbit of y would have infinitely many points
outside Bp, which contradicts the fact that the orbit of y stabilizes.
Going back to the map f , the fixed point wp corresponds to a periodic
orbit γp := {wp, f(wp), . . . , f p−1(wp)} of f having period p and the
orbit of x converges to γp. This shows that every regular point x ∈ Rˆ1
converges under the map f to a periodic orbit. Since any periodic point
of f corresponds to a unique fixed point of P , we have shown that the
attractor of f consists of a finite number of periodic orbits, which are
fixed points of the Poncare´ map P . Thus, f is asymptotically periodic.
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6. Bifurcation of periodic orbits
In this section we study the bifurcations of the attractor of T . Given
k ∈ N, let Pk be the extension of P |Bk (see Lemma 4.2) to an affine
contraction on R3 and denote by wk its unique fixed point.
Lemma 6.1.
wk =
(
λk−1(1− λk)
1− λ3k ,
1− λk−1 + λ3k−1 − λ3k
1− λ3k ,
λ2k−1(1− λk)
1− λ3k
)
.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that wk = Pk(wk). 
The points wk may not be fixed points for the Poincare´ map P as
one has to check that wk ∈ Bk and Bk 6= ∅. However, as the following
lemma shows, P has no other periodic points besides the fixed points
of the branch maps of P .
Lemma 6.2. If x ∈ B is a periodic point of P , then it has period one,
i.e., it is a fixed point of P . Moreover, x = wk for some k ∈ N.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 1.1 it is shown that the orbit of any
regular point converges, under the Poincare´ map P , to a fixed point of
P . Hence, any periodic point of P has to be a fixed point of a branch
map P |Bk for some k ∈ N. 
In the parameter plane (α, λ) ∈ P := R+×(0, 1) consider the regions
Rk, with k ∈ N, defined by
Rk :=
{
(α, λ) ∈ P : λk < α and qα,λ(λk) < 0
}
,
where qα,λ is the quadratic polynomial
qα,λ(x) = (α− λ−1(α− 1))x2 + (α− λ−1(2α + 1))x+ α.
Lemma 6.3. wk is a fixed point of P if and only if (α, λ) ∈ Rk.
Proof. By Lemma 4.2, we have that wk ∈ Bk if and only if
bk−1 < S2(uα) · wk < bk.
Using the expression in Lemma 6.1 for wk it is straightforward to see
that these two inequalities define the set Rk. Since Bk might be empty,
it remains to show that in fact wk ∈ B whenever (α, λ) ∈ Rk. By the
definition of B we have that wk ∈ B if and only if
1 < uα · wk < λ−1α− α + 1 and S(uα) · wk < 1.
By the inequalities that define Rk it is straightforward to see that
qα,λ(λ
k) < 0⇔ uα · wk > 1
and
λk − α < 0⇔ uα · wk < α
(
λ−1 − 1)+ 1.
The other inequality is proved in a similar way. 
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The region R1 is defined by λ < α since the inequality qα,λ(λ) < 0
holds true for every (α, λ) ∈ P . Regarding the second region R2 we
have,
R2 =
{
(α, λ) ∈ P : λ2 < α ∧
(
λ ≥ λ∗ ∨ α < λ(1 + λ)
1− λ− λ3
)}
,
where λ∗ = 0.682328... is the unique real root2 of the polynomial 1 −
λ− λ3. For the remaining regions, k ≥ 3, we have
Rk =
{
(α, λ) ∈ P : λk < α < λ
k−1(1− λk)
1− λk−1 − (1− λ)(λ2k−1 + λk−1)
}
.
Using this description of the regions Rk we obtain Figure 5.
Figure 5. Plot of the regions R1, . . . ,R4 inside the rectangle
(0, 2]×(0, 1) ⊂ P. The regionR1 is delimited by the brown straight
line, the region R2 is delimited by the red curves, the region R3
is delimited by the green curves and the region R4 is delimited by
the blue curves. In the parameter plane P only the regions R1 and
R2 are unbounded.
Let
rα(λ) :=
1 + 2α− αλ−√α2 (4− 3λ2) + α(4− 6λ) + 1
2(αλ− α + 1) . (4)
Lemma 6.4. For every (α, λ) ∈ P,
(1) 0 < rα(λ) < λ and rα(λ) < αλ;
(2) rα(λ) is the unique root of qα,λ in the interval (0, 1);
(3) qα,λ(x) < 0 for x ∈ (0, 1) if and only if x > rα(λ).
Proof. We omit the proof as it is a straightforward analysis of the
function rα. 
2The inverse of the supergolden ratio.
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From this lemma it is immediate that
Rk = {(α, λ) ∈ P : rα(λ) < λk < α}, k ∈ N.
Therefore, the fixed points of P appear consecutively, in the sense of
the following lemma.
Lemma 6.5. If wk and wk′ are fixed points of P with k ≤ k′, then wj
is a fixed point of P for every k ≤ j ≤ k′.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 6.3 that, given (α, λ) ∈ Rk ∩ Rk′ with
k ≤ k′, we have to show that (α, λ) ∈ Rj for every k ≤ j ≤ k′. Indeed,
since k ≤ j ≤ k′ we have λj ≤ λk < α and rα(λ) < λk′ ≤ λj. This
shows that (α, λ) ∈ Rj. 
Since the fixed points of P form a chain in B, we denote by hα(λ)
the head of the chain, i.e., the first k ∈ N for which wk is a fixed point
of P ,
hα(λ) := min{k ∈ N : (α, λ) ∈ Rk}.
Similarly, we define tα(λ) to be the tail of the chain, i.e.,
tα(λ) := max{k ∈ N : (α, λ) ∈ Rk}.
By Lemma 6.5, the number of distinct fixed points of P is
Nα(λ) := tα(λ)− hα(λ) + 1.
The following lemma gives explicit formulas for the head and tail func-
tions and describes their asymptotic behaviour.
Lemma 6.6. For every α > 0, the head and tail functions are mono-
tonically increasing in λ. Moreover,
(1)
hα(λ) = mα(λ) =
{
1, α ≥ 1
blogλ αc+ 1, α < 1
;
(2)
tα(λ) = dlogλ rα(λ)e − 1;
(3)
lim
λ→0
Nα(λ) = 1;
(4) if α ≥ 1, then
lim
λ→1
Nα(λ) =
{⌈
3α
α−1
⌉− 1, α > 1
∞, α = 1 ;
(5) if α < 1, then
lim inf
λ→1
Nα(λ) =
⌈
1 + α + α2
1− α
⌉
− 1,
lim sup
λ→1
Nα(λ) =
⌈
1 + α + α2
1− α
⌉
.
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Proof. The monotonicity of hα and tα follows from items (1) and (2).
Now we prove the claim in each item:
(1) Given (α, λ) ∈ P , the head hα(λ) is the smallest natural number
k such that k ∈ Iα,λ := (logλ α, logλ rα(λ)). By the 2nd inequal-
ity of Lemma 6.4, the open interval Iα,λ has length greater than
1. Hence,
hα(λ) = max{1, blogλ αc+ 1}.
(2) Similarly, the tail tα(λ) is the greatest natural number k such
that k ∈ Iα,λ. Because rα(λ) < λ by Lemma 6.4, we have
logλ rα(λ) > 1. Thus tα(λ) = dlogλ rα(λ)e − 1.
(3) Immediate from (1) and (2).
(4) When α ≥ 1,
Nα(λ) = dlogλ rα(λ)e − 1.
Notice that rα(1) = 1. Taking the limit using L’Hoˆpital’s rule
we get
lim
λ→1
log rα(λ)
log λ
= r′α(1) =
3α
α− 1 .
(5) When α < 1,
Nα(λ) = dlogλ rα(λ)e − blogλ αc − 1.
By the properties3 of the floor and ceiling functions, we have
the lower and upper bound
logλ(rα(λ)/α)− 1 ≤ Nα(λ) < logλ(rα(λ)/α) + 1.
Notice that rα(1) = α. Again, by L’Hoˆpital’s rule we get
lim
λ→1
log(rα(λ)/α)
log λ
=
r′α(1)
α
=
1 + α + α2
1− α ,
from which the conclusion follows.

Let Υk denote the periodic orbit of T passing through wk. By
Lemma 6.3, such orbit exists whenever (α, λ) ∈ Rk. Moreover, ac-
cording to Lemma 3.2, the periodic orbit Υk has period 3k, since
σk(wk) = 1.
We summarize the discussion of this section in the following theorem
that, together with Lemma 6.6, completely characterizes the bifurca-
tions of the attractor of T and its limit as λ→ 1.
Denote by Λα(λ) the attractor of T .
Theorem 6.7. For every (α, λ) ∈ P, the attractor Λα(λ) is the union
of Nα(λ) distinct periodic orbits Υk for k = hα(λ), . . . , tα(λ). Each
periodic orbit Υk has period 3k.
3For every x ∈ R, x ≤ bxc < x+ 1 and x− 1 < dxe ≤ x.
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Moreover, in the symmetric case (α = 1) the number of periodic
orbits Nα(λ) grows to infinity as λ→ 1 whereas, in the non-symmetric
case (α 6= 1), the number of periodic orbits Nα(λ) stays bounded as
λ→ 1, i.e.,
lim
λ→1
Nα(λ) =
⌈
3α
α− 1
⌉
− 1, α > 1
and
lim inf
λ→1
Nα(λ) =
⌈
1 + α + α2
1− α
⌉
− 1, lim sup
λ→1
Nα(λ) =
⌈
1 + α + α2
1− α
⌉
,
when α < 1. Regarding the limit of the attractor as λ→ 1 we have,
lim
λ→1
Λα(λ) =
{
E, α ≥ 1
Sα, α < 1
,
where E =
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
is the Nash equilibrium of the game and Sα the
Shapley triangle, i.e., the triangle with vertices {vα, S(vα), S2(vα)} where
vα =
1
1+α+α2
(α, 1, α2). The limit in the previous expression is inter-
preted in the Hausdorff metric.
Proof. It remains to prove the claim regarding the limit of the attractor.
In the case α ≥ 1 we have hα(λ) = 1 and tα(λ) ≤ 3αα−1 . Using the
expression in Lemma 6.3 we get,
lim
λ→1
w 3α
α−1
=
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
.
When α < 1, we have by Lemma 6.6,
logλ α ≤ hα(λ) ≤ tα(λ) ≤ logλ rα(λ).
Using again the expression in Lemma 6.3 we conclude that,
lim
λ→1
wlogλ α = limλ→1
wlogλ rα(λ) =
1
1 + α + α2
(α, 1, α2).
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
6.1. Phase portraits and basins of attraction. Notice that the
number N(ε) of periodic strategies referred in the introduction equals
Nα(λ), where λ = 1− ε as defined in Section 2.
By Lemma 6.6, the number of periodic orbits of the map T in the
symmetric case (α = 1) is given by
N1(λ) =
⌈
logλ
(
3− λ−√3(1− λ)(3 + λ)
2λ
)⌉
− 1,
Notice that h1(λ) = 1 and N1(λ) ↗ ∞ as λ → 1. In Figure 6 we
plot the graph of N1(λ), where we can see for each λ ∈ (0, 1) the
corresponding number of periodic orbits.
For instance, when λ = 4
5
we have that N1(
4
5
) = 3 (see Figure 6
and Figure 7a). In Figure 7 we present the basins of attraction of the
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Figure 6. Graph of N1(λ). The sequence {λn}n≥1 of dis-
continuities of N1(λ) is defined by the equation r1(λn) = λ
n+2
n ,
n ∈ N, which can be solved to give an approximate value of λn,
e.g., λ1 ≈ 0.39265 and λ2 ≈ 0.69461.
corresponding periodic orbits for the symmetric case (α = 1) for some
values of the parameter λ, namely for λ = 4
5
(where N1(
4
5
) = 3), for
λ = 5
6
(where N1(
5
6
) = 4), for λ = 25
28
(where N1(
25
28
) = 5), and for
λ = 25
27
(where N1(
25
27
) = 6).
In the non-symmetric favourable case (α > 1), by (4) of Lemma 6.6,
the plot of Nα is similar to N1 but with a finite number
⌈
3α
α−1
⌉ − 1 of
plateaus (whence discontinuities). In the non-symmetric unfavourable
case (α < 1), by (5) of Lemma 6.6, the number of periodic orbits Nα(λ)
oscillates in the limit λ→ 1 between the values⌈
1 + α + α2
1− α
⌉
− 1 and
⌈
1 + α + α2
1− α
⌉
.
The behaviour of Nα(λ) is depicted in Figure 8. For instance, when
α = 1
2
, the number of periodic orbits oscillates between 3 and 4 as λ→
1. In Figure 9 we present the basins of attraction of the periodic orbits
for the unfavourable game with α = 1
2
for the values of the parameter
λ ∈ {100
113
, 25
28
, 100
111
, 10
11
}
. In all those examples the number of periodic
orbits oscillates between 2 and 3 since the first λ for which N 1
2
(λ) = 4 is
approximately 0.953613. However, computing and colouring the basins
of attraction of the periodic orbits (the least period being 45) demands
for a greater computational effort compared to the examples computed
in Figure 9. Indeed, the number of elements in the partition forming
the basins of attraction of the periodic orbits is 2133.
7. Conclusion and open problems
In this paper we show that the dynamics of the discretized best-
response function for the RPS game with payoff matrix (1) is asymp-
totically periodic. In fact we prove that its attractor is finite and
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(a) λ = 45 = 0.8
(3 periodic orbits)
(b) λ = 56 ≈ 0.832
(4 periodic orbits)
(c) λ = 2528 ≈ 0.893
(5 periodic orbits)
(d) λ = 2527 ≈ 0.926
(6 periodic orbits)
Figure 7. Basins of attraction of the corresponding periodic
orbits for some values of the parameter λ in the symmetric case
(α = 1), where the color is the basin of attraction of the periodic
orbit with period 3, color for period 6, for 9, for 12, for
15, and for 18.
periodic in the sense that any strategy converges to a periodic strategy
and there are at most a finite number of them. Moreover, we fully
characterize this dynamics as a function of the parameters α = a/b
and λ (related to the step of the discretization). Namely, we determine
the exact number of periodic strategies, their period, and location, as
a function of the parameters α and λ. We believe that our methods
can be applied to study the discretized best-response dynamics of other
games, such as 2× 2 bimatrix games.
The discretized best-response dynamics of the RPS game belongs to
a special class of dynamical systems with discontinuities called planar
piecewise affine contractions. In [5] it is proved that a generic planar
piecewise affine contraction is asymptotically periodic, i.e., the attrac-
tor is finite and periodic for almost every choice of the branch fixed
points of the affine contractions. In our case, the branch fixed points
are pure strategies and thus cannot be used as a varying parameter.
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Figure 8. Graph of N 1
2
(λ).
The dynamics of other classes of piecewise contractions has been re-
cently investigated in [9, 21, 7, 8, 19, 20].
A paradigmatic one-dimensional piecewise contraction that illustrates
the typical dynamical behaviour that one can observe is the contracted
rotation f : [0, 1)→ [0, 1) defined by
f(x) = λx+ b (mod 1)
with parameters λ ∈ (0, 1) and b ∈ (0, 1) such that λ+ b > 1 [14]. The
map f can be seen as a circle map with a single discontinuity point
at x = 0. Then, associated to f , one can define the rotation number
ρ(f) which describes the asymptotic rate of rotation of f . Depending
on the arithmetical properties of ρ(f), the map f can display distinct
dynamical phenomenon. When ρ(f) is rational, f has a unique periodic
orbit which is a global attractor. On the other hand, when ρ(f) is
irrational, f is quasi-periodic, in the sense that the global attractor is
a Cantor set. It would be interesting to construct a game for which the
discretized best-response dynamics is quasi-periodic.
Based on these works we conjecture that for any discretization step
and for almost every payoff matrix A, the corresponding discretized
best-response dynamics is asymptotically periodic.
Another interesting line of research would be to consider variable
contraction rates
xn+1 = λnxn + (1− λn)BR(xn)
where λn ∈ (0, 1) for every n ≥ 0 which are either deterministic or
random. In the deterministic case, the contraction rates λn could be
generated by a dynamical system λn+1 = g(λn) where g : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
is an interval map which models how the fraction of the population
that chooses to play the same strategy varies over time. In the case of
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(a) λ = 100113 ≈ 0.885
(3 periodic orbits)
(b) λ = 2528 ≈ 0.893
(2 periodic orbits)
(c) λ = 100111 ≈ 0.901
(3 periodic orbits)
(d) λ = 1011 ≈ 0.909
(2 periodic orbits)
Figure 9. Basins of attraction of the corresponding periodic
orbits for some values of the parameter λ in the non symmetric
case with a = 12 and b = 1 (α =
1
2 ), where the color is the
basin of attraction of the periodic orbit with period 18, color for
period 21, for 24, and for 27.
the original Brown’s fictitious play, λn = 1 − 1n which is the orbit of
g(λ) = 1
2−λ starting at λ1 = 0. Notice that the point λ = 1 is a neutral
fixed point of g. Alternatively, {λn}n≥0 could be an ergodic Markov
chain and one could study the existence of ergodic stationary measures
for the random discretized best-response dynamics.
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Appendix A. Monotonicity lemmas
Recall that
m = mα(λ) := min{k ∈ N : λk < α}.
and that Bˆ is the set of regular strategies in B, i.e., Bˆ = B ∩ ∆ˆ.
Lemma A.1. Let x ∈ Bˆ. If n(x) ≥ m, then n(P (x)) ≥ m.
Proof. We suppose that m ≥ 2. Otherwise there is nothing to prove.
Let x ∈ Bk for some k ≥ m. Then
S2(uα) · P (x) = λkS(uα) · x+ (1− λk−1)(2 + α).
Since x ∈ Bk, we have
S(uα) · x = 3− uα · x− S2(uα) · x
> 3− (λ−1α− α + 1)− bk.
Hence,
S2(uα) · P (x) > 2 + α− λk−1 − αλ−1.
Therefore, to prove that n(P (x)) ≥ m, it is sufficient to show that
g(λ) := 2 + α− λk−1 − αλ−1 − bm−1 > 0.
Notice that
g(λ) = λ−1(α + 1− λk − λ−m+1α).
Since λm < α and λk ≤ λm we get,
g(λ) > λ−1(1− λ−m+1α).
Again, by the definition of m, we have λm−1 ≥ α. This shows that
g(λ) > 0 as we wanted to prove. 
Lemma A.2. Let x ∈ Bˆ such that n(P (x)) ≥ m. If n(P (x)) ≤ n(x),
then n(P 2(x)) ≤ n(P (x)).
Proof. We want to prove that given k ∈ N, if x ∈ Bk and P (x) ∈ Bj
for some j ≤ k, then P 2(x) ∈ Bi for some i ≤ j, for any α > 0 and
λ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying λj < α.
So its enough to see that
S2(uα) · P 2(x) < bj = λ−j−1α− λ−1(α− 1 + (1− λ)(α + 2)).
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Since x ∈ Bk,
P (x) = λkS(x) + λk−1(1− λ)e1 + (1− λk−1)e2
and P (x) ∈ Bj implies that
P 2(x) = λjS(P (x)) + λj−1(1− λ)e1 + (1− λj−1)e2
= λj+kS2(x) + λj+k−1(1− λ)e3 + λj(1− λk−1)e1 + λj−1(1− λ)e1
+ (1− λj−1)e2.
Because S2(uα) = (0, 2 + α, 1− α), we have that
S2(uα) ·P 2(x) = λj+kuα · x− λj+k−1(1− λ)(α− 1) + (1− λj−1)(2 +α).
But uα · x < α (λ−1 − 1) + 1, thus
S2(uα) · P 2(x) < Qj,k,α(λ),
where
Qj,k,α(λ) := λ
j+k
(
λ−1α− α + 1)−λj+k−1(1−λ)(α−1)+(1−λj−1)(2+α).
Now it is easy to see that Qj,k,α(λ) < bj for every α > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1)
satisfying λj < α. Indeed,
λj+1(Qj,k,α(λ)− bj) = λj
(
λj+k − 2λj + 1)− α (λj − 1)2
≤ λj (λ2j − 2λj + 1)− α (λj − 1)2
= (λj − 1)2(λj − α) < 0.

Lemma A.3. Let x ∈ Bˆ such that n(P (x)) < m. If n(P (x)) ≥ n(x),
then n(P 2(x)) ≥ n(P (x)).
Proof. The strategy of the proof is the same as that of the previous
lemma. We want to prove that given k ∈ N, if x ∈ Bk and P (x) ∈ Bj
for some k ≤ j < m, then P 2(x) ∈ Bi for some i ≥ j, for any α > 0
and λ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying λj ≥ α.
It is enough to see that
S2(uα) · P 2(x) > bj−1 = λ−jα− λ−1(α− 1 + (1− λ)(α + 2)).
As in the proof of the previous lemma we have that
S2(uα) · P 2(x) = λj+kuα · x− λj+k−1(1− λ)(α− 1) + (1− λj−1)(2 + α).
But uα · x > 1, so
S2(uα) · P 2(x) > Qj,k,α(λ),
where
Qj,k,α(λ) := λ
j+k − λj+k−1(1− λ)(α− 1) + (1− λj−1)(2 + α).
Now it is easy to see that Qj,k,α(λ) > bj−1 for every α > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1)
satisfying λj ≥ α. Indeed,
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gj,k,α(λ) := λ
j+1(Qj,k,α(λ)− bj−1)
= αλ2j+k+1 − (α− 1)λ2j+k − (2 + α)λ2j + (1 + 2α)λj − αλ
= α(1− λ)(1− λ2j+k) + λ2j+k − (2 + α)λ2j + (1 + 2α)λj − α
> λ2j+k − (2 + α)λ2j + (1 + 2α)λj − α
≥ λ3j − (2 + α)λ2j + (1 + 2α)λj − α
= λ3j − 3λ2j + 3λj − 1− (α− 1)(λ2j − 2λj + 1)
= (λj − 1)3 − (α− 1)(λj − 1)2
= (λj − 1)2 (λj − α) ≥ 0.
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